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‘Irish Fever’ in Britain during the Great Famine:  
Immigration, Disease and the Legacy of ‘Black ‘47’  
 
 
During the worst year of the Great Irish Famine, ‘Black ‘47’, tens of thousands of 
people fled across the Irish Sea from Ireland to Britain, desperately escaping the 
starvation and disease plaguing their country. These refugees, crowding 
unavoidably into the most insalubrious accommodation British towns and cities 
had to offer, were soon blamed for deadly outbreaks of epidemic typhus which 
emerged across the country during the first half of 1847. Indeed, they were accused 
of transporting the pestilence, then raging in Ireland, over with them. Typhus 
mortality rates in Ireland and Britain soared, and so closely connected with the 
disease were the Irish in Britain that it was widely referred to as ‘Irish fever’. Much 
of what we know about this epidemic is based on a handful of studies focussing 
almost exclusively on major cities along the British west-coast. Moreover, there 
has been little attempt to understand the legacy of the episode on the Irish in 
Britain. Taking a national perspective, this article argues that the ‘Irish fever’ 
epidemic of 1847 spread far beyond the western ports of entry, and that the 
epidemic, by entrenching the association of the Irish with deadly disease, 
contributed significantly to the difficulties Britain’s Irish population faced in the 
1850s.  
 
 
 
The 1840s were a climacteric decade for the United Kingdom, especially Ireland. What made 
this so on the neighbouring island was an existential demographic crisis, the ‘Great Famine’ of 
1846-51, caused by potato blight which ruined several annual harvests. Around a million 
people died in Ireland, and even more than that number fled oversees, mainly to Britain and 
North America. Consequently, Ireland’s population fell from a peak of around 8.5 million in 
1845 to 6.5 million in 1851.1 The 1840s created lesser but still prounced trials for the working 
classes in Britain. Dubbed the ‘Hungry Forties’ many years later, this was a decade of 
unemployment, hardship and privation.2 In particular, the year 1847, known as ‘Black ‘47’ in 
Ireland, brought acute economic depression in manufacturing areas across Britain.3 With 
British workers already fearful for the livelihoods, mass Irish immigration, which began at the 
                                                          
1 Census of Ireland, 1851; Joel Mokyr, Why Ireland Starved: A Quantitative and Analytical History of the Irish 
Economy, 1800-1850 (London, 1983), ch.3; Cormac Ó Gráda, Black ’47 and Beyond: The Great Irish Famine 
(Princeton NJ, 1999). 
2 Altough the term ‘Hungry Forties’ was in fact invented in the early 1900s to frame national debates about Tariff 
Reform,  the politics of the term need not concern us when discussing the mass migration of Irish into Britain. 
Jane Cobden Unwin, The Hungry Forties: Life under the Bread Tax; Being Testimonies of Witnesses Now Living 
in Sussex (London, 1904). The term was popularise in Free Trade-Protection debates in Edwardian Britain. Now 
it is a commonplace for that decade. For critical perspectives, see: W.H. Chaloner, The Hungry Forties: A 
Reexamination (London, 1958); A.C. Howe, ‘Towards the “Hungry Forties”: Free Trade in Britain, c.1880-1906’, 
in E. Biagini (ed.), Citizenship and Community: Liberals, Radicals and Collective Identities in the British Isles, 
1865-1931 (Cambridge, 1996), pp.193-218; and James Vernon, Hunger: A History (Cambridge MA, 2007), chap, 
and the sources cited there. 
3 L. Darwen, ‘Implementing and Administering the New Poor Law in the Industrial North: A Case Study of 
Preston Union in Regional Context, 1837-61’, PhD Dissertation, Nottinham Trent University (2016), pp.85-91; 
R. C. O. Matthews, A Study in Trade Cylce History: Economic Fluctuations in Great Britain, 1833-1842 
(Cambridge, 1954).  
end of 1846, met considerable hostility. Moreover, in addition to the perceived labour market 
implications of immigration from Ireland was the more tangible threat of disease. Many of the 
Irish who landed in Britain in 1847 were carrying a virulent form of typhus fever that, as we 
shall we see, was ravaging famine-stricken parts of Ireland with great intensity. An epidemic 
soon took root in Britain. The Irish in Britain had long been associated with disease, in part 
because they tended to reside in the most insalubrious urban locales, and because commentators 
and political theorists such as J.P. Kay, Thomas Carlyle, Friedrich Engels, and many others, 
presented these immigrants as a sub-human threat to the very body of British social and 
political life.4 However, what went before was dwarfed both by the realities and the cultural 
production associated with the Famine inrush and the great typhus outbreak of 1847. Indeed, 
this outbreak remains exceptional in the annals of modern British history as the only epidemic 
to be universally associated with mass immigration.5 It was one of the deadliest episodes of 
epidemic typhus to occur during the nineteenth century, and so closely were the Famine Irish 
associated with its emergence and spread that it was widely referred to as ‘Irish Fever’.6  
 In Britain, as in North America where masses of fever-stricken Irish arrived on aptly named 
‘coffin ships’, the impact of the epidemic on mortality was considerable, as were its social and 
political implications.7 Yet, with few notable exceptions, this episode has received surprisingly 
little historiographical attention.8 The US dimensions of this typhus epidemic have received 
some attention, like their UK counterpart, but not systematically.9 Some of the classic studies 
on the Irish in Britain have described individual cases, offering insights from contemporary 
accounts of particular rookeries, courts, alleys and yards, such as those in the Walmgate area 
of York where in 1847 a local surgeon, William Proctor, recounted fear at the risks of typhus 
spreading among and beyond the Irish who ‘swarm together in the lodging houses.’10 Neal’s 
work, particularly on Liverpool where Dr Duncan, the town’s first Medical Officer of Health, 
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described a ‘City of Plague’ in 1847, has shown the effects of mass Irish immigration at the 
major ports of disembarkation along the west-coast.11 Yet, there has been little attempt to assess 
the impact of the epidemic nationally, nor has there has been any serious attempt to consider 
the legacy of the epidemic on the Irish in Britain. While Belchem has acknowledged that typhus 
shaped both experiences and perceptions of the Irish in Liverpool, and Davis has argued more 
broadly that Irish migrants faced ‘fervent hostility…as disseminators of killer diseases’, its 
wider implications remain largely unexplored.12 To read the historiography of ‘Irish Fever’ in 
Britain in 1847, one might leave with the impression that this was a relatively short lived and, 
though tragic, soon forgotten affair which was largely confined to a handful of major towns 
and cities along the west-coast. Lees’ otherwise excellent study of London is quite typical, 
describing in close detail the social geography of the slums inhabited by so many Irish in 
London but saying nothing of the typhus which neverthless was rife among the Irish in the 
city.13 Similarly, Ruth-Ann Harris’ study of Irish labour migration to Britain finds no reason to 
consider how disease may have affected labour relations.14  
To discount the nationwide effects of ‘Irish Fever’ in Britain, and to overlook its deep 
penetration of society beyond the western ports of disembarkation, would be wrong. Serious 
outbreaks of typhus fever were reported all across the country in 1847; in towns, villages, 
workhouses and vagrancy wards. Moreover, while the term ‘Irish Fever’ was used by medical 
professionals on both sides of the Atlantic to refer to a severe form of typhus thought to 
originate in Ireland, it also served, inevitably, as a stigmatising epithet. The events of 1847, we 
argue, entrenched in the British psyche the association of the Irish with life-threatening 
pestilence. Indeed, a link between ‘Irish Fever’ and the rise of overt restrictive practices against 
the Irish in the labour market has been indicated elsewhere.15 The crystallising image of the 
Irish poor in Britain as dirty, disease carrying, profligate and, above all, inferior to the British 
working class – views which found expression in many ‘Condition of England’ reports from 
the 1830s to the 1850s – was fortified by the immigration and disease crisis of the late 1840s. 
Certainly, the role of disease, in creating a sense of apartness which defined the Irish experience 
in Britain in the wake of the Famine, deserves much fuller attention.  
The present article attempts to do just that. It reappraises what we know about ‘Irish Fever’, 
offering the first national study of the 1847 epidemic. It builds on the valuable work 
undertaken, particularly by Neal, on the major urban centres around the west coast in which an 
inextricable link, widely held by contemporaries, between mass Irish immigration and 
outbreaks of epidemic typhus has been demonstrated.16 The story that unfolds here is directly 
related to the inadequate response of the government to the crisis in Ireland, which encouraged 
mass immigration. What made the British context worse was the refusal of Westminster to 
                                                          
11 F. Neal, ‘Lancashire, the famine and the poor laws, p.33. 
12 Belchem, Irish, Catholic and Scouse: The History of the Liverpool-Irish, 1800-1939 (2007), pp.60-61; G. Davis, 
The Irish in Britain, 1815-1914 (Gill and Macmillan, 1991), p.115. 
13 Lyn Hollen Lees, Exiles of Erin: Irish Migrants in Victorian Britain (Manchester, 1979), esp ch. 3. 
14 Ruth Ann M. Harris, The Nearest Place that Wasn’t Ireland: Early Nineteenth-Century Irish Labor Migration 
(Ames, Iowa, 1994), a study which explores as far as the early 1840s. 
15 Donald M. MacRaild, ‘“No Irish need apply”: The origins and persistence of a prejudice’, Labour History 
Review, 78, 3 (2013), pp.269-299. 
16 F. Neal, Black ’47, which looks more generally at the crisis of mass immigration with respect to local state 
responses, but says little about typhus beyond Liverpool in a systematic way. See also his Sectarian Violence: the 
Liverpool Experience, 1819-1914 (Liverpool, 1988), which explores Irish poverty in the context of nativist 
animus, and his ‘The Irish steamship companies and the Famine Irish’, Immigrants and Minorities, 5, 1 (1986), 
pp.28-61. 
assist local authorities in badly affected parts of the country, despite many importunate 
communications.17  
The construction of a national history of the ‘Irish Fever’ epidemic requires the bringing 
together of a wide range of soruces from different places. Indeed, while this study takes a 
national perspective it is, fundamentally, based around a mosaic of local and regional 
experiences. Much of the material featured in this article was located in regional archives, 
parliamentary papers and other published and unpublished reports, and national and provincial 
newspapers. The voluminous MH/12 Poor Law files, held at the National Archives, which 
include all correspondence between regional Poor Law Assistant Commissioners and local 
board of guardians, have proven particularly valuable. So too has another in this series, MH/32, 
which includes reports and other correspondence sent by the Assistant Commissioners to their 
superiors at Somerset House in London. Taken together, these various sources have allowed 
us to examine the interconnected local, regional and above all national impress of ‘Irish Fever’ 
across Britain during its worst year in 1847. The article is structured in three main parts: the 
geography of ‘Irish Fever’ in 1847; the responses of the authorities to the crisis; and, finally, 
the legacy of the epidemic on perceptions of the Irish in Britain.  
 
Irish Immigration and ‘Irish Fever’ in Context 
Since before the Napoleonic Wars the Irish had emigrated to Britain as both permanent settlers 
and transient labourers. As a consequence, certainly by the 1820s distinct Irish communities 
existed well beyond the major ports of disembarkation. Although just under half of Britain’s 
416,000 Irish-born residents in 1841 lived in one of four cities—Liverpool, London, 
Manchester and Glasgow—sizeable Irish populations could be found in settlements across 
northern and midlands England, central Scotland and South Wales. While there was no such 
thing as a typical Irish immigrant in Britain, the Irish were nonetheless disproportionately 
represented in low paid causal occupations, and tended to reside in the more deprived areas of 
British towns and cities.18 Here, in the cheap, densely populated cellars, lodging houses and 
rented tenements which characterised Britain’s urban slums, squalor and disease abounded as 
public health commentators at this time knew all too well.19  
It was into these environments that the Famine Irish flooded from late 1846, as hunger began 
to bite hard at home. The term ‘flooded’ is, indeed, appropriate, and was frequently used by 
contemporaries to describe the sudden, unprecedented movement of people from Ireland to 
Britain in this period.20 It was estimated that during ‘Black ’47’, the worst year of the Great 
Famine, some 116,000 destitute Irish refugees arrived in Liverpool by steamer with the 
intention of remaining in the country, and a further 50,000 in Glasgow.21 This massive and 
very sudden movement of people overwhelmed the authorities, who were wholly unprepared 
to manage a crisis on this scale.  
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Disease was a major factor in Irish Famine deaths, thus providing additional motivation to 
migration.22 Disease tended to finish off those weakened victims of extreme hunger; but it also 
worked more generally on those whose victim C intake had fallen due to the loss of sufficient 
potatoes.23 Epidemic typhus raged in Ireland from early 1847, as the effects of famine became 
more acute. Its virulence is captured in a report in the Census of Ireland (1851), which showed 
that between 1845, when the ‘Blight’ first struck, and 1847, the darkest year of the famine, 
deaths from epidemic disease climbed eightfold, from 7,249 to 57,095. Thereafter, deaths fell 
but remained shockingly high: 45,948 (1848), 39,316 (1849) and 23,545 (1850).24 While 
migration was a means of escape, disease also spread more quickly among highly mobile 
populations. As we shall see later, typhus particularly prospered on the bodies of those who, as 
they travelled around, lacked access to water, cooking utensils, clean clothes, and could not 
properly wash.25 
This was the context within which this ‘Irish Fever’ or ‘Irish typhus’, passed rapidly to 
Britain, and was noted for its ‘highly contagious nature’. The carriers also were noted as ‘those 
who fled in dismay from the famine and the pestilence to the sister kingdom—where it spread 
throughout Glasgow, Liverpool, Birmingham, Manchester, and other towns and districts to 
which the Irish emigrants flocked.’26 Contemporaries in Britain were convinced that mass 
Famine-related immigration from Ireland was the cause of the epidemic in Britain. ‘There is 
every reason’, stated the Manchester Courier in July 1847, ‘to ascribe the introduction of fever 
to the immigrant Irish…huddled up and over-crowded as they have been in the filthy lodging 
houses to which they resort.’27  Dr Duncan in Liverpool denigrated the Irish ‘in dirty lodging 
houses…who are least cleanly in their habits.’28 In a similar vein, the Registrar General’s 1847 
report on mortality referred to the ‘disastrous effect of the immigration of the Irish poor on the 
health of English towns’.29 Such statements could be repeated almost ad infinitum.  
The notion that Irish immigrants brought ‘Irish Fever’ to Britain is historiographically 
uncontroversial. The evidence in support of such an interpretation is overwhelming. Yet, it is 
only one side of the coin. Typhus is a highly contagious louse-borne-disease, and it thrives in 
insanitary and overcrowded environs. The disease was almost certainly endemic in parts of 
urban Britain for much of the nineteenth century. When the Famine Irish came to Britain in 
1847, desitite and devoid of accommodation, and began cramming into the very worst housing, 
it did not take long for the tentacles of typhus fever to begin spreading. In times of social crisis, 
as Hardy argues, ‘patterns of human behavious alter; and increased mobility, domestic 
crowding and reduced personal hygine result in epidemics.’30 While many Irish undoubtedly 
brought ‘Irish Fever’ with them to Britain, the 1847 epidemic was also the consequence of their 
miserable circumstances once they had arrived.   
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What precisely ‘Irish Fever’ was, however, is less clear to us today. While contemporaries 
in the 1840s diagnosed it as typhus, we must be cautious. At the time of the Great Famine, 
medical science had not yet established a clinical distinction between typhus and diseases such 
as typhoid and relapsing fever which display similar symptoms. Only in 1849 was an accepted 
distinction between typhus and typhoid discovered, and the Registrar General did not begin 
distinguishing between the two diseases in his reports until the late 1860s.31 Nor was it known 
until the early twentieth century that typhus and relapsing fever were louse-borne diseases, 
whereas typhoid was transmitted through food and water sources. In our period, all three were 
associated with the miasmatic theory of disease transmission. What we do know, however, is 
that Victorian medics and social observers recognised what they believed to be typhus, and 
acted accordingly. The numbers we use, and the cases we report, are based on the perceptions 
of these people. They were at the frontline of the response. While it is very likely that the term 
‘Irish Fever’ was widely and, at times, inappropriately used in 1847, particularly to diagnose 
the Irish, we are not too concerned by this problem for the purposes of our study. What 
contemporaries thought ‘Irish Fever’ was, and how they dealt with it, is more important here. 
Retrospective disgnosis would, in any case, be futile given the limitations of the evidence 
available. The deadly nature of the 1847 epidemic, which we explore in the following section, 
also indicates that ‘Irish Fever’ was indeed largely or, as the nineteenth century medical 
historian Charles Creighton argued, ‘almost wholly’ typhus.32  
 
The Geography of ‘Irish fever’ in Britain  
While there was considerable geographical variation in the magnitude of the ‘Irish Fever’ 
crisis, few regions were unaffected. The epidemic was a transnational problem that linked 
either side of the Irish Sea. We have described how severe the Irish situation was, and over in 
Britain, in July 1847, the Monthly Journal of Medical Science predicted no ‘large town in the 
kingdom will escape the prevalent [fever] epidemic.’33 With few exceptions, this grim forecast 
came true. By this time the epidemic had been raging in and around Britain’s west coast ports 
for several months, and had started to spread inland. The progress of the epidemic received 
considerable attention in local newspapers, and these reports provide some indication of its 
development. Thus, in January and February of 1847, following the arrival (also widely 
reported) of tens of thousands of ‘half naked and starving’ Irish immigrants during the previous 
few months, newspapers on both sides of the Irish Sea began reporting serious outbreaks of 
epidemic disease in Liverpool and Glasgow.34 By May, reports had emerged on outbreaks in 
Birmingham, Cardiff, Leeds, London, Manchester, Newcastle, Newport and many other places 
in between.35  
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Not restricted to major cities and ports, the epidemic came to the attention of provincial 
newspapers in areas well away from immediate threat. Thus, readers in Norfolk, on the English 
east coast, were informed in May 1847 that ‘The influx of Irish paupers is introducing the 
typhus fever in this country to a great extent. Liverpool, Manchester, Rochdale, Doncaster, 
Hull, Stafford are all suffering from this cause.’36 Around the same time readers in the southern 
county of Hampshire were given the news that ‘Bristol…is, in common with Newport and other 
places on the western coast, now suffering from the ravages of the typhus fever imported from 
Ireland.’37 The population of Hampshire, living in a coastal region situated between Bristol and 
London, may have had some cause for concern, but the local reporting was not alarmist. The 
same is not true in areas much closer to the scene of pestilence. In Sheffield, for example, 
readers were warned that ‘fever, which has originated in the Irish Famine [is making] fearful 
ravages in the towns of Manchester, Rochdale and Leeds’.38 Leeds was only 30 miles away 
from Sheffield, and the newspaper urged the Sheffield poor law guardians to be prepared to 
open a fever hospital if disease appeared in the town.  
Such fears were not misplaced, for when epidemic typhus struck, the effects could be 
devastating. The annual reports of the Registrar General show that in 1847 over 30,000 people 
in England and Wales died of typhus fever.39 While typhus was endemic in British towns and 
cities until the late nineteenth century, these figures suggest considerable excess mortality from 
this cause in 1847. Table 1 shows the number of deaths attributed to typhus by the Registrar 
General in eleven English and Welsh divisions between 1847 and 1851. It indicates that during 
the worst year of the crisis, 1847, the number of deaths was roughly double that of relatively 
normal years of typhus mortality such as 1849-51.40  Excess mortality as a consequence of 
typhus fever in 1847 therefore, probably stood at something in the region of 13,000-15,000. 
Moreover, that Irish immigration was chiefly responsible for the crisis is suggested by the 
spatial and chronological pattern of the figures. The areas badly affected by typhus in 1847—
London, the three Midland divisions, North Western, York, Northern and Welsh—all included 
either a main port of entry for the Famine Irish or a concentration of large urban centres 
containing pre-existing Irish communities. These were the regions to which the Famine Irish 
flocked in the late 1840s; in the North-Western division, where the port of Liverpool acted as 
the gateway to the region for hundreds of thousands of Irish immigrants, the effects were 
particularly severe.41 Parts of southern England, East Anglia, Devon and Cornwall were 
relatively undisturbed by the effects of immigration and typhus although some parts of the rural 
south, as we shall see, did not avoid ‘Irish fever’ entirely. The main difference from Scotland, 
as well as the north and midlands of England, was that the rural outbreaks were not so 
dramtically clustered because centres of population were much smaller. 
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Table 1: Mortality from Typhus Fever in Eleven English and Welsh Divisions, 1847-51 
 
Division 1847 1848 1949 1850 1851 
London 3,184 3,584 2,482 1,929 2,140 
South Eastern 1,884 1,971 1,843 1,274 1,444 
South Midland 2,030 1,867 1,533 1,224 1,256 
Eastern 1,260 1,083 1,111 1,010 943 
South Western 1,662 1,637 1,707 1,462 1,708 
West Midland 3,388 2,568 2,040 1,642 2,270 
North Midland 1,664 1,238 929 789 977 
North Western 9,076 3,380 2,534 2,079 2,716 
York 2,880 1,909 1,567 1,252 1,687 
Northern 1,304 950 673 506 725 
Welsh 1,966 1,225 1,360 1,139 1,255 
Total 30,298 21,412 17,779 14,306 17,121 
Sources: Tenth Annual Report of the Registrar General (1852), pp.288-370; Eleventh Annual Report of the 
Registrar General (1852), pp.288-305; Twelfth Annual Report of the Registrar General (1854), pp.258-369; 
Thirteenth Annual Report of the Registrar General (1855), pp.150-167; Fourteenth Annual Report of the 
Registrar General (1856).   
 
Mortality is, however, only one way of looking at the ‘Irish fever’ epidemic, and it seriously 
underrepresents the scale of the crisis. Most people who contracted typhus did not die; the 
mortality rate of typhus sufferers treated by the poor law was, as we shall see, under 10 per 
cent. As such, mortality figures say nothing of the masses who contracted ‘Irish fever’ but 
survived. We are fortunate here for the existence of an unpublished series of returns, heretofore 
unused by historians, which feature data on the number of fever cases treated each week in the 
forty poor law unions of Lancashire and Yorkshire between June and September 1847. This 
was the worst phase of the epidemic. The information was obtained at the request of Assistant 
Poor Law Commissioner Alfred Austin, who sent circulars to all unions in his district asking 
for weekly updates on the number of people treated for typhus and ‘other’ fevers, as well as 
the number of such cases that were new (i.e. had not received treatment previously) and the 
number that had died.  
With few exceptions, poor law officials dutifully provided the returns, and the evidence 
presents a much closer representation of the real scale of the crisis than do mortality figures.42 
The data shows that, at the aggregate level, between 19 June and 18 September 1847, the 
number of people treated for fever each week in the 40 Poor Law unions of Lancashire and the 
West Riding peaked at slightly over 9,000, and never fell below 4,000 (Figure 1). These are 
astonishing numbers. In total, some 35,500 fever-stricken individuals received medical care 
from the poor law in the region during these three months alone, the overwhelming majority 
of whom were diagnosed with typhus fever. Moreover, while during the highest period (week 
ending 10 July) the number of cases was more than double that of the lowest (week ending 11 
September), by no means was the epidemic over by the latter date. Separate data from 
Manchester, published weekly in the town’s local newspapers, shows that the number typhus 
cases remained considerably above normal levels until March 1848 (Figure 2).        
 
 
                                                          
42 The National Archives (TNA), MH32/7 (1847-49).   
Figure 1: Cases of Typhus and ‘Other’ Fevers Treated by the Poor Law in Lancashire and the West 
Riding, June-Sept1847 
 
 
Source: TNA MH32/7 (1847-49). ‘Typhus’ and ‘Other’ fever cases have been combined for the ‘Total’ figure.   
 
Figure 2: Cases of Typhus and ‘Other’ fever treated weekly in Manchester, July 1847 - March 1848 
 
 
Source: The data for this graph has been taken from the weekly reports of the Manchester Board of Guardians’ 
meetings, published in the Manchester Courier.  
 
Within these aggregated figures there was marked geographical variation. Table 2 features 
the ten unions which treated the largest number of fever cases during the three months covered 
in Austin’s returns. It shows that Liverpool, the ‘hospital and cemetery of Ireland’ as the 
General Registrar described the town in 1847, accounted for 54 per cent of the fever cases, and  
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Table 2: Regional Distribution of the Fever cases Treated in Lancashire and the West Riding 
 
Poor Law Union Region Number of cases % of total cases 
Liverpool South West Lancashire 19,177 54 
Manchester South East Lancashire 5343 15 
West Derby South West Lancashire 1758 5 
Leeds Yorkshire, West Riding 1491 4 
Bolton South East Lancashire 901 3 
Preston North Lancashire 862 2 
Prescot South West Lancashire 684 2 
Chorlton South East Lancashire 469 1 
Blackburn North Lancashire 437 1 
Sheffield Yorkshire, West Riding 424 1 
Other Lancashire and West Riding 4,031 11 
Total Lancashire and West Riding 35,577 99 
Source: TNA MH32/7 (1847-49).   
 
Manchester 15 per cent.43 More broadly, unions around Manchester in south east Lancashire, 
and around Liverpool in the south west, predominate. Considerable numbers, however, were 
treated across the region in settlements both large and small, and it might come as some 
surprise, given the dominant place of Liverpool in the historiography of ‘Irish Fever’, that the 
town only accounted for half of the regional total. What we are seeing here is the arrival and 
dispersal of the Famine Irish throughout the northern manufacturing districts. We would expect 
to see large numbers of fever patients treated in Liverpool, Manchester and other major 
northern towns. That these places drew huge numbers of Irish immigrants in 1847 is well 
documented. More unexpected is the impact in places like Prescot, a relatively small market 
town of around 5,500 inhabitants in 1841. Situated some 10 miles east of Liverpool, Prescot 
had long attracted Irish agricultural labourers seeking employment in the expansive rural 
hinterland which surrounded the township. In 1847, a report by the Board of Guardians stated 
that many such people arrived carrying disease.44 
Yet, of probably greater significance on the spread of fever in the town was that Prescot was 
used as a staging post by Irish immigrants tramping from Liverpool towards industrial south 
east Lancashire and beyond. The Prescot union vagrant ward provided shelter to some 9,800 
individuals in 1847, the majority of whom were Irish. Thus, a population around double the 
size of Prescot’s in 1841 passed through the town in 1847. The Guardians calculated that a sum 
of £363 was spent on medical care for non-settled fever-stricken paupers in 1847, and that the 
Irish accounted for £232 (64%) of this total. Moreover, among the Irish patients it was those 
who had been in Prescot ‘but a short time’, and who were, presumably, mainly Famine Irish, 
that proved the greater financial burden, accounting for around 80 per cent of the expenditure.45  
The movement of Famine Irish across the northern manufacturing districts, and subsequent 
outbreaks of epidemic disease in the region, represents a microcosm of a much broader pattern 
in 1847. All major ports down the west coast, from Glasgow to Bristol, attracted unprecedented 
numbers of Irish immigrants, and these arrivals moved far and wide. In Glasgow, very much 
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44 TNA, MH12/6095, Prescot Union.  
45 TNA, MH12/6095, Prescot Union. 
the Liverpool of Scotland in terms of Irish immigration, around 11,500 fever patients were 
admitted to the various hospitals in the city in 1847; at the Glasgow Royal Infirmary, 
admissions in 1847 were 270 per cent higher than in 1846.46 At the port of Newport in South 
Wales, a medical officer at the temporary fever hospital reported having treated something in 
the region of 6,000 fever-stricken Irish between May and November 1847.47 In London, 
admissions to the London Fever Hospital increased threefold during the summer of 1847. One 
physician in the city noted that many fever patients in his hospital had ‘just arrived from 
Ireland’, and he posited that the epidemic originated ‘among the very lowest orders, [and] 
emanated from the districts – courts and alleys – densely populated with Irish.’48 Over in the 
north-east, the Newcastle Board of Guardians reported serious outbreaks of fever in the 
summer of 1847 ‘inconsequence of the influx of Irish.’49  
Landlocked towns and cities, away from the major ports of entry, did not escape. In 
Birmingham, for example, 380 workhouse inmates died between January and September 1847 
compared to 232 in the whole of 1846, and this increase was largely the result of the 108 deaths 
attributed to ‘Irish fever’.50 The movement of Irish across Britain, as they tramped for work or 
to find kin, was even felt in parts of the south where ‘Irish fever’ was largely avoided. A report 
on vagrancy in several rural southern counties during the first six months of 1847 showed that 
the number of Irish ‘vagrants’ relieved in workhouses was 11,548, some 476 per cent higher 
than during the last six months of 1846.51 Here, the incidence of typhus fever, while 
numerically relatively small, increased in the same period from 33 cases in 1846 to 231 in 
1847. With no mere hyperbole did W. D. Boase, in a report on vagrancy for the Poor Law 
Commission in 1848, postulate that ‘The most mischievous disease is a low kind of typhus 
fever, which particularly attaches itself to the Irish, and was in almost every workhouse last 
year.’52     
   
Responding to ‘Irish fever’: Prevention and cure 
While the ‘Irish fever’ epidemic of 1847 was, in a very real sense, a national crisis with a 
transational nature, the responsibility for dealing with the situation fell squarely upon a mosaic 
of local authorities. The costs of relief fell as a charge on the local rates. In north-west England 
and in Glasgow, poor law guardians petitioned parliament during the first half of 1847 asking 
for financial assistance with their relief efforts and for restrictions to be placed on the number 
of Irish coming over to Britain, but to no avail. At the beginning of the year several boards of 
guardians in Lancashire and Yorkshire signed a petition which proclaimed that it ‘is neither 
just nor legal that we should, in addition to our present heavy burdens, be called upon to support 
in whole or in part the poor who belong to [Ireland]’, but the government refused to interfere.53 
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1847.  
47 Dublin Quarterly Journal of Medical Science, vol 5 (1849), pp.439-40. 
48 The London Medical Gazette, 29 (1847), p.972. 
49 Davis has argued that in Newcastle in 1847 a report by the medical officer did not associate the Irish with the 
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However, several Catholic clergymen did attest to the influx of Irish as being the cause of typhus, as did members 
of the town’s ‘Institute for the Prevention of Contagious Fever in Newcastle’ in their annual report: Newcastle 
Guardian and Tyne Mercury, 12 June 1847. Also, see Newcastle Guardian and Tyne Mercury, 12 June, 1847. 
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counties were Berkshire, Dorset, Hampshire, Oxfordshire, Surrey, Sussex and Wiltshere.  
52 BPP, Reports and Communications on Vagrancy, p.36 
53 The petition was created by the Howden poor law union in Yorkshire, and was adopted by many unions in the 
region.  
The Liverpool authorities, who had more reason that any to request assistance from 
Westminster, were granted some retired war ships to act as temporary lazarettos, but this was 
the sum of the government’s charity.54 While Assistant Poor Law Commissioners, as the MH12 
and MH32 volumes show, regularly visited unions in their districts in 1847 to check on how 
boards of guardians were managing, and maintained frequent written communication 
throughout the course of the epidemic, local authorities were left, for the most part, alone to 
deal with the crisis. 
Responsibility for providing aid to the majority of those with ‘Irish fever’ fell on poor law 
guardians. These local office-holders had an unequivocal obligation to provide medical care to 
all people in urgent need (including those who were sick) regardless of their settlement status.55 
As such, the recently arrived Irish, who did not possess a legal settlement in Britain, had a right 
to receive medical care if they applied to the poor law when struck down by ‘Irish fever’ or 
another serious ailment. Moreover, they could not legally be removed back to Ireland while 
they were sick. The difficulties all this placed on boards of guardians in 1847 has already been 
indicated by the sheer number of people treated with this disease in the north of England. 
Indeed, Kinealy is certainly correct in describing Irish immigrants in Britain in 1847 as 
‘unwelcome guests’.56 But these guests could not be ignored. In normal times, people with 
fever would have been treated under the poor law in one of two ways; either in an institution 
(a workhouse or fever hospital) or in their own homes.57 Much depended on the facilities 
available in the localities.58 In some larger towns and cities, dedicated fever hospitals, owned 
or subscribed to by poor law authorities, provided medical treatment in a relatively specialised 
environment. More often, however, the only institutional medical care available to the poor 
was in the workhouse, and many had no separate wards for fever patients at all. Home treatment 
was common, despite the obvious dangers in cases of contagious disease. But whatever the 
situation, normal practices were soon disrupted in many poor law unions during the first half 
of 1847 when epidemic fever emerged following the arrival of masses of Irish refugees. Fever 
hospitals and workhouse fever wards, where they existed, quickly became grossly 
overcrowded. Moreover, it became far too dangerous to treat large numbers of people with 
fever in the overpopulated slums where ‘Irish fever’ took root. Many Irish sufferers, of course, 
were new arrivals and had no homes to speak of.  
While, as several studies have discussed, a consensus had yet to emerge by the end of the 
1840s on the cause(s) of epidemic disease, many agreed that isolating victims was the best 
course to take once an epidemic had broken out.59 The ‘Irish fever’ epidemic of 1847 in Britain 
demonstrates that this view was generally held by local medical officers. Almost everywhere 
we look during the first half of 1847, outbreaks of epidemic fever were met with calls to open 
temporary fever hospitals as an emergency measure. Indeed, what is striking about the medical 
response to typhus fever in 1847 is its standardisation in a system otherwise prone to 
considerable local variation.60 While some guardians were slower to react than others for 
                                                          
54 Liverpool Mercury, 7 May 1847; 18 May 1847; 25 June 1847; 2 July 1847. Neal, Black ’47, p.123-157. 
55 Neal, Black ’47, p.217. 
56 C. Kinealy, This Great Calamity: The Irish Famine, 1845-52 (1994), p.336.  
57 J. Pickstone, ‘Dearth, Dirt and Fever Epidemics: Rewriting the History of British ‘Public Health’, 1780-1850’, 
in P. Slack (ed.) Epidemics and Ideas: Essays on the Historical Perception of Pestilence, pp.125-48. 
58 F. Driver, Power and Pauperism: The Workhouse System, 1834-1884 (Cambridge, 1993), pp.73-94. 
59 Pickstone, ‘Dearth, Dirt and Fever’, p.131-33 
60 While poor law policy and practice at local level invariably varied between unions, such was the nature of poor 
law administration which allowed boards of guardians considerable autonomy, it is the similarities rather than the 
differences in regional responses to the 1847 epidemic that stand out. Boards of guardians no doubt looked to 
neighbouring unions for guidance. For more on local/regional differentatiuion of poor law administration 
generally, see Driver, Power and Pauperism, pp.32-57; E. Hurren, Protesting about Pauperism: Povertry, Politics 
reasons peculiar to each locality, the tendency of fever hospitals to isolate victims was 
common, even in smaller unions well away from the major urban centres. It is worth noting 
that this trend also occurred in Ireland in response to fever. During the Famine over 200 
temporary fever hospitals were opened, although many were too small and the sheer weight of 
pressure on the rates meant guardians struggled to provide adequate accommodation. Many 
fever victims had to enter workhouses as a result, and these institutions became, as O’Grada 
has shown, dens of deadly contagious disease.61 Many refused to enter these institutions 
altogether, so deadly was their reputation. 
The opening of fever facilities in Britain typically involved either renting an abandoned 
building in the local area and converting it into a makeshift fever hospital, or erecting a 
temporary structure, usually out of wood, and selling the materials once the epidemic had 
passed. This practice was not entirely novel in 1847, but it was certainly unprecedented in 
scale. In Liverpool, for example, nine emergency fever hospitals (including five lazarettos), 
capable of collectively holding 1,400 patients, were opened between December 1846 and July 
1847, but no such separate institutions appear to have been opened during the previous typhus 
epidemic a decade earlier. The same is true of Manchester, were three fever hospitals with 
capacity for over 1,400 patients were opened between April and July 1847. Across Lancashire 
as a whole, a total of 23 temporary fever hospitals were opened in 1847, and many more were 
opened in towns and cities across Britain in areas of heavy Irish immigration.62  
London was the unusual case. Alone of the places affected by ‘Irish fever’ in 1847-48, few, 
if any, temporary fever hospitals appear to have been opened. There were reasons for this. Its 
location in the south east meant far fewer famine-stricken Irish arrived in the metropolis than 
arrived on the west coast. Moreover, the range and size of existing institutional medical 
facilities in London was much greater than almost anywhere else. In the London Fever 
Hospital, the capital already possessed a large institution dedicated to the treatment of fever 
patients. At the end of June 1847 Alexander Tweedie, physician at the London Fever Hospital, 
stated in a letter to the Evening Mail, which he wrote in response to an ‘extensively circulated’ 
newspaper report claiming epidemic fever was prevalent in the city, that the Fever Hospital 
was adequately coping with the increased numbers of fever patients. Denying that typhus was 
in fact epidemic in the capital, Tweedie wrote that ‘London…affords at this time a striking 
contrast to many of the large provincial towns, in which typhus fever, from causes which it is 
unnecessary to advert to at present, prevails to such an alarming extent.’63 While mortality 
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figures, as we have seen, indicate that typhus was certainly much more prevalent than normal 
in London in 1847-48, and evidence of Irish immigration and the emergence of disease in the 
capital can be found in MH12 and MH32, Tweedie’s letter does highlight a notable distinction 
between London and those towns and cities at the frontline nearer the west-coast.64      
The reason the practice of opening temporary fever hospitals was so widely adopted, relative 
to previous typhus epidemics, is not immediately apparent. However, two reasons seem to 
provide plausible explanations. The first is the sheer numbers involved. Typhus fever took the 
lives of some 50,000 people in England and Wales in 1847-48, compared to 28,000 during the 
previous epidemic a decade earlier, and the aggregate number of typhus cases ran into several 
hundred thousand as we have seen. Such numbers simply overwhelmed existing 
accommodation. But more than this, and secondly, the prevalence of fever among recently 
arrived Irish immigrants, so many of whom had no homes of their own and were crowding into 
the most inhospitable slums, meant treating them in their locales posed the very serious danger 
of perpetuating the spread of disease. There is an inextricable link between Irish immigration 
and fever hospital construction in 1847, and this is clear when we look at the ethnic composition 
of fever patients.  
While there was no organised central attempt, either by the Poor Law Commissioners or 
government, to collect information on the ethnic origin of fever patients during the epidemic, 
evidence where it survives is revealing despite its patchiness. In Liverpool, Dr Duncan 
estimated that over 8 in every 10 typhus victims were Irish, and in Manchester a medical officer 
observed that during the height of the epidemic in the summer of 1847 it was ‘rare to find an 
English person as a patient’ inside the walls of the town’s fever hospitals.65 Figures from 
elsewhere point to the same conclusion. Thus, in Ashton under Lyne, near Manchester, 42 of 
the first 48 cases taken into the temporary fever hospital when it opened in July 1847 were 
Irish, and over the Pennines in York during the same month the Irish represented 51 of the first 
52 fever hospital patients.66 It is clear that these institutions were opened in response to the 
desperate situation caused by Irish immigration.67 Figures covering a somewhat longer period, 
June to September 1847, exist for Rochdale in south east Lancashire and Huddersfield in the 
West Riding. The former shows that 108 of 122 admissions during this 3-month period were 
Irish, the latter 117 out of 153.68 In Birmingham, 79 out of 90 fever patients admitted to the 
workhouse medical ward in April 1847 were Irish, and in the London Fever Hospital the Irish 
accounted for some two-thirds of admissions around the same time.69 More evidence could be 
presented, but it would only repeat this pattern. While it does appear that the proportion of 
English patients began to rise towards the end of 1847, indicating that the disease was 
beginning to spread beyond the largely Irish areas in which it emerged, all the evidence we 
possess reveals a considerable preponderance, usually in the order of 80 per cent or more, of 
Irish patients in British fever hospitals during the worst phase of the epidemic in the summer 
of 1847.  
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A rather more difficult issue is whether the interests of local authorities were directed as 
much to cure as to prevention. In other words, did the temporary fever hospitals simply act as 
receptacles in which fever cases could be isolated, with little concern for what happened to 
them thereafter? As is often the case with historical records, they do not tell us everything we 
would like to know. Motivations were complex, difficult to untangle, and often unspoken. Poor 
law guardians lived in a different world to the poor patients admitted to the fever hospitals. 
Their concerns were necessarily practical. The fever hospitals they opened were often, and 
unavoidably, extremely rudimentary. Empty mills and warehouses provided the better 
accommodation, but such buildings were not always available and guardians had to take 
whatever they could get. At Ashton under Lyne, for example, the guardians after much 
searching reluctantly settled on renting a row of abandoned cottages because they were the 
only suitable premises available to them, and this was not uncommon.70 The temporary wooden 
constructions guardians often resorted to, usually when no suitable existing accommodation 
could be obtained, resembled barns or large sheds. Indeed, the term ‘fever shed’ was often used 
to describe these structures.  
Yet, for all this, the fever hospitals do appear to have provided a level of care which ensured 
that the vast majority of patients survived. Beds and other necessary equipment were 
purchased, and staffs of masters, matrons, doctors and nurses were employed on temporary 
contracts. Patients were attended to around the clock. The case fatality rate of typhus patients 
in Lancashire and Yorkshire, according to the statistical information derived from Austin’s 
returns discussed earlier, was 7 per cent; only in Liverpool, an exceptional case, did the figure 
reach 10 per cent.71 The case fatality rate of epidemic typhus when untreated can be as high as 
40 per cent.72 While we cannot infer too much from this, as it is undoubtedly true that some of 
the typhus cases were misdiagnosed, it does nonetheless indicate that many lives were saved 
by the medical attention provided by the poor law. Detailed evidence from Huddersfield shows 
that patients were often spending many weeks in the fever hospital, some 20 per cent at least 
one month.73 They were not being hastily discharged, expensive burden though they were on 
local rates. Moreover, it would be remiss not to note the efforts of the medical attendants in the 
fever hospitals, astonishing numbers of whom caught typhus fever and lost their lives in the 
course of their onerous duties. Like the Catholic clergymen who attended to dying fever 
patients in the workhouses and fever hospitals, the lives of poor law officials were in serious 
danger in 1847; those working in fever hospitals particularly so due to their frequent contact 
with contagious disease in an enclosed environment. Reports of poor law officials dying of 
typhus fever in 1847 abound in local newspapers and guardians’ minute books. In Lancashire, 
the deaths of over 50 poor law officials had been reported by the end of the year, and in 
Birmingham alone over 20 such cases were reported. These figures almost certainly under-
record the number of actual deaths, as the deaths of lowly fever hospital nurses rarely received 
press attention. There cannot have been many occupations in Britain more hazardous in 1847 
than that of a medical attendant in an urban fever hospital. 
The fever hospitals, beneficial though they were to the poor, had a serious drawback: 
patients invariably went back to their miserable locales, the source of pestilence, when they 
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were discharged. Thus, while these institutions probably helped prevent the spread of disease 
by isolating the afflicted, the problem of overcrowding, which assisted the transmission of 
disease, endured. One way in which poor law authorities tackled this problem was through the 
legal channel of removing Irish paupers back home.74 The rigour with which removal 
legislation was invoked in 1847 varied spatially, but it was increasingly used by poor law 
unions around the British west coast, particularly after the legal process was simplified in June 
following a campaign by the Liverpool Select Vestry.75 Although paupers could not be 
removed while they were sick, they could be when convalescing if a medical officer deemed 
them fit enough for the journey. Neal has described removal policies against the Irish in 1847 
as ‘harsh’ and ‘penny pinching’, and the former is undoubtedly true at the individual level.76 
Yet, it is important to view removal policies at this time not simply and a means of saving the 
rates by sending paupers away or deterring them from applying for poor relief, but also as a 
vital element in the battle against epidemic disease. The Liverpool poor law authorities 
removed an unprecedented number of Irish paupers, 15,000, in 1847, many of whom had only 
been in Britain for a few days or weeks.77 This was a near threefold increase on 1846. The 
Manchester Courier newspaper was quick to celebrate the benefits of this process when it 
began apace at the end of June:   
We are happy to say that the Irish paupers are being re-convened from this port to their own 
country at the average rate of about 100 per day, and that [Liverpool] is, inconsequence, 
very much less unhealthy than it has been for months past. The Select Vestry are at present 
engaged in diminishing the number of inmates in the workhouse, the fever hospitals, the 
fever sheds, and the lazarettos, by drafting them back to Ireland, and this process will be 
continued until some of the receptacles for disease are emptied and closed.78   
Many other unions followed suite. Several poor law unions in Lancashire resolved in the 
summer of 1847 to removal all non-settled Irish paupers who were in a healthy enough 
condition, as did the authorities in Glasgow who removed some 8,000 Irish in 1847 against 
3,000 in 1846.79 Evidence from South Wales indicates that removal was also stringently 
applied. In Cardiff, the guardians resolved to remove all non-settled Irish paupers upon their 
second application for relief, a policy designed to ensure the destitute Irish did not remain long 
in the area.80 
A policy of near indiscriminate removal of non-settled Irish paupers, which was certainly 
operating in Liverpool and Glasgow in 1847, was not, however, employed universally during 
the crisis. The cost of removal increased by distance, so Irish removals were much less common 
in areas without convenient and cheap access to ports on the British west coast from where 
they were repatriated. Other policies were, however, adopted at local level in 1847 specifically 
to deter the Irish from entering and settling in a particular area. Indeed, evidence indicates that 
the stringent removal policies employed in Liverpool and Glasgow actually encouraged many 
Famine Irish to move inland. In June 1847, just as Liverpool began removing non-settled Irish 
paupers en masse, Assistant Poor Law Commissioner Alfred Austin wrote to unions in his 
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district warning them to expect a rise in Irish vagrancy, the assumption being that the Irish, 
rather than face removal, would try their luck elsewhere.81 The measures applied locally to 
combat Irish vagrancy were legion, and varied from place to place as is true of all aspects of 
local administration at this time, but it is possible to provide a general impression. It is apparent 
that restrictions were often placed on the number of nights tramps could spend in vagrant wards 
each month (usually only two), and outdoor relief was rarely provided except in urgent cases 
and only for a short period of time. The situation in Stockport, Cheshire, where relief policy 
was devised so as not to ‘hold out any inducement for…[Irish] families to come into this 
already overburdened district’ was quite typical; generous relief would only serve to attract 
more Irish vagrants.82 Evidence indicates that many Irish, understandably, shunned the poor 
law for fear of being removed and instead turned to begging, but local authorities took a hard 
line. Vagrants were often arrested for soliciting alms on the street, and might even be given 
hard labour or, more usually it seems, told by the sitting magistrates to move on. Countless 
more were simply ushered out of town by the police. The following newspaper report on the 
small west-midlands town of Burslem in May 1847 is illustrative:  
IRISH FEVER – At the police court…Mr D. Ball, of Burslem, surgeon, called the attention 
of the magistrates to the fact of a great number of Irish immigrants now endeavouring to 
settle in the town and vicinity of Burslem, and noticed the danger of their introducing fever 
and other contagious diseases amongst the inhabitants. Mr. Ball considered it necessary that 
some steps should be taken to supress, at least, begging, which would be one means of 
deterring them from staying in the neighbourhood. The bench instructed the police-officers 
and constables of the district to use every exertion to supress vagrancy, and to pass the Irish 
through and out of the unions.83   
Conversations such as this, which much have been influenced in part by reports in national and 
provincial newspapers on the situation in the north-west and elsewhere, took place among local 
authorities in many parts of the country in 1847. Fear of the Irish vagrant, or perhaps more 
accurately fear of disease, fuelled local policy decisions in response to Irish immigration in 
Britain during the Great Famine. 
 
The legacy of ‘Irish Fever’ 
The ‘Irish fever’ epidemic of 1847 had social and political implications which went beyond the 
immediately tragic consequences for the Famine Irish themselves. That there were enduring 
legacies is hardly surprising. The sudden and largely unexpected arrival of unprecedented 
numbers of destitute Irish refugees into Britain in 1847, many of whom were thought to be 
carrying deadly pestilence, shaped perceptions of the Irish, adding to an air of more general 
negativity which had been shaping since the 1830s as immigrant numbers grew. Scholars have 
noted workplace competition and fighting over alleged undercutting of wages. Religious 
differences also elided with these social and demographic crises, when in 1850 the pope re-
established the Roman Catholic hierarchy to provide ministry to this greatly-enlarged Irish 
Catholic community; the hardline Protestant response was to dub this the ‘Papal Aggression’. 
Set within the ‘Year of Revolutions’, which frightened ruling elites, and the threat from Chartist 
agitation, the Irish Rising of 1848 also strengthened animus to the ungrateful Irish. The 1847 
fever epidemic contributed a precise local and national element to strained Anglo-Irish 
                                                          
81 His letter was featured in the poor law minute books of the Fylde Union, LA PUF 1/3. 
82 TNA, MH12/1141, Stockport union. 
83 Staffordshire Advertiser, 15 May 1847.  
relations in Britain.84 Workers had further reasons to focus their own anxieties over the slim 
pickings of the 1840s on this competitive and increasing type of labour competition, the Irish.85 
While the Irish by no means lived exclusively in their own ghettoes, the combination of all 
these factors certainly pressurised Irish folk in urban Britain. In Lancashire, it led to a descent 
into sectarian politics, with ‘Orange’ and ‘Green’, Tory and Liberal divisions accentuated.86  
The Great Famine brought Ireland’s socio-economic problems into sharp focus; indeed, it 
exported some of those problems to Britain itself. Contemporaries at the national and local 
levels on the larger island demanded the passage of reform through Parliament, in part to deter 
mass immigration. The cry that ‘Irish property must support Irish poverty’ was frequently 
heard.87 Those who wished Ireland to be self-sufficent urged the government to reform the Irish 
Poor Law, as it was believed that the harsh workhouse-based system in Ireland was 
encouraging people to flee to Britain to take advantage of its more liberal welfare system. Tied 
to this were demands for Irish landlords to support their tenants, rather than callously evicting 
them from their homes and leaving them with little choice but to enter the workhouse or to 
emigrate. The petition from several Lancashire poor law unions in early 1847, noted earlier, 
which declared it to be ‘neither just nor legal’ that they should support Ireland’s poor, is 
indicative of these expressions. ‘Irish Fever’ is central to all this. Consider, for example, a May 
1847 editorial in the Morning Advertiser, which lamented that the ‘Irish malignant fever has 
demonstrated its presence within a short distance of the Royal Palace’, and used this 
circumstance to blame ‘Irish landlordism’ for evicting tenants who then imported fever to 
Britain.88 Or, in similar vein, the Evening Mail, which justified the need for a reformed Irish 
Poor Law by arguing, with more than a little sensationalism, that England was suffering ‘no 
less than Ireland’ as a result of the Famine; ‘English towns’, it stated, ‘groan beneath the burden 
of Irish immigration, and tremble at the presence of Irish contagion’.89  
The question that we would like to ask here is how far ‘Irish fever’ influenced short and 
long-term perceptions of the Irish in Britain, and, by extension, the lived experiences of Irish 
immigrants themselves. Our conclusions must be only partial. While we know much about 
middle-class opinion in this period, the British and Irish poor are together a conspicuously 
silent majority. It would be fascinating to understand what working-class British men and 
women, particularly those who lived in or near to poor Irish-dominated areas in British towns 
and cities, thought about Irish immigration and its associated problems during ‘Black ‘47’ and 
beyond, but we simply do not know. One can only imagine that it augmented racial tensions 
between native Britons and Irish immigrants to at least some degree. Evidence sometimes 
points in this direction. The opening of the temporary fever hospitals in Britain in 1847, for 
example, often met very fierce opposition from local residents, and many petitions were sent 
to Parliament or the Poor Law Commission in attempts to block their establishment.90 The 
psychological effects of ‘Irish fever’ are apparent here, with locals expressing grave concerns 
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about the spread of pestilence in their streets should these institutions be opened nearby. We 
might reasonably suppose, given that the Famine Irish were associated with the epidemic 
outbreaks which necessitated these hospitals, that anti-Irish sentiment lay at least partly behind 
these local protests. We can also suggest that such sentiment was heightened when it became 
clear that most of the fever hospital patients were Irish. Yet, the evidence provides no clear 
answers. In the town of Bury, Lancashire, in July 1847, an anonymous notice was posted on a 
wall outside the board of guardians’ offices warning the public against being ‘robbed by those 
lazy Irish vagabonds, who leave their country uncultured, and come to live upon your rates’.91 
Still, we are left wondering whether such a statement was indicative of a general view among 
natives in the town. 
We know much more about the views of local officials such as poor law guardians and 
councillors, whose meetings were often reported verbatim in provincial newspapers, although 
ambiguities remain. Many certainly expressed sympathy for the Irish and encouraged humane 
treatment, and it is important to note that criticism of mass Irish immigration in 1847 was rarely 
directed towards the Famine Irish themselves. Rather, the failure of Parliament to adequately 
reform the Irish Poor Law, their refusal to limit the number of Irish immigrants coming over, 
and the callousness of Irish landlords were the main subjects of their ire. But this does not mean 
that humane treatment followed. The removal strategies adopted by poor law guardians on the 
west coast, and the wider responses of local authorities to Irish immigration and Irish vagrancy 
in 1847, shows that harsh measures were employed even though cruelty was not intentional. 
Poor law guardians, who had no financial assistance from the government despite requests for 
such, had only limited options available to them, and the very serious threat posed by epidemic 
disease meant their policies were geared more towards protecting the resident population than 
the destitute arrivals from across the Irish Sea. In Manchester, a deputation of local dignitaries 
attended a meeting of the board of guardians in May 1847 to draw attention to the hardships 
faced by many Irish who, it was stated, were not applying for poor relief because they feared 
being removed back to Ireland. ‘There are in this town’, stated one member of the deputation, 
James Heywood, soon to be the MP for North Lancashire, ‘a number of Irish, who are afraid, 
if they apply for relief, of being moved to Ireland, where there is an absolute famine, and yet 
many of these poor creatures are starving and dying of fever’.92 Heywood’s statement met 
generally sympathetic ears, but the guardians protested that there was little they could do as 
their resources were so stretched. While they agreed to look into the matter, the number of Irish 
removals in Manchester actually increased during the months that followed.  
Regardless of the motivations of public officials and of wider public sentiment, there can be 
little doubt that the short-term consequences of Irish immigration and attendant disease was 
considerable hardship and privation for the Irish in Britain themselves.93 The absence of 
anything more than very short-term support from the poor law, and strict local responses to 
vagrancy, meant the Famine Irish, who often arrived in Britain with little or nothing to support 
themselves, must have found it very difficult to manage. Indeed, as the manufacturing districts 
of England, Scotland and Wales were enduring a period of intense economic distress, 
employment would have been particularly hard to obtain. Moreover, even the Irish-born who 
had been resident in Britain for years could be affected by policies adopted in response to 
Famine-related immigration. Many Irish removals in the late 1840s appear to have been 
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extremely harsh, and some were certainly illegal.94 People living in Britain for several years, 
sometimes decades, were unceremoniously shipped back to a country gripped by famine and 
pestilence because they received poor relief or medical care without having obtained settlement 
status. While the Great Famine acted as a trigger for wider discussions on the equity of removal 
legislation in the 1850s and 1860s, including pressure to abolish settlement and removal 
altogether, the legacy of the events of the late 1840s also acted as a buffer against significant 
change.95 Concerns over what might happen if famine struck again in Ireland, and more general 
fears that Britain would be swamped by Irish immigrants should the power to remove non-
settled paupers be taken away, stifled attempts at meaningful reform. It was not until the 1860s 
that the settlement laws were modified, and the power to remove paupers was not abolished 
until the twentieth century. 
In other ways, the events of the late 1840s appear to have left a legacy of prejudice and 
exclusion against the Irish in Britain. Memories of the ‘Irish fever’ epidemic did not fade 
quickly. The episode featured frequently in public health debates at local level in the 1850s, 
following the introduction of the Public Health Act in 1848.96 With this, the Irish association 
with disease endured. Moreover, ‘Condition of England’ surveys in the 1850s, following a 
tradition which had its roots in the 1830s, presented highly jaundiced descriptions of the Irish 
as uncivilised, insanitary and disease ridden. In a description of Oldham, Lancashire, published 
in the Morning Chronicle newspaper at the end of 1849 as one of a series of social surveys 
covering England and Wales, it was reported that ‘The poor law authorities of Oldham are 
making attempts to improve the sanitary state of the worst districts of the town but the Irish 
puzzle them. “No sooner”, I was informed, “do we try to make the houses a little decent and 
wholesome, that the people leave them for other localities”…Fever—the “Irish Fever”—one 
of the most malignant species of spotted typhus, frequently breaks out.’97 The notion that the 
Irish actually preferred to live in a state of filth, thus creating the conditions for pestilence to 
thrive, was a common trope in such writings. As Lord Shaftsbury, the noted philanthropist and 
social reformer, stated, ‘was it not found that where the Irish appeared, wages lowered, 
respectability disappeared, and slovenliness and filth prevailed?’98 The extent to which this 
stigma affected the day-to-day lives of the Irish in Britain is not clear. There can, however, be 
little doubt that it contributed towards the isolation and exclusion which historians of Britain’s 
Irish-born population have identified during the 1850s and 1860s.99  
It is no coincidence that advertising against Irish labour extended greatly in the later 1840s, 
reaching a peak in the 1850s. The use of the discriminatory term ‘No Irish Need Apply’ (NINA) 
in job advertising was merely the tip of the ice-berg. Whilst it applied to farm servants and 
others, too, it was principally applied in the domestic service sector, both in private homes and 
in public places, such as hotels and pubs. Its manifestations were most marked in London, 
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Liverpool and Manchester, which accounted for 95% of all discovered incidents.100 While 
NINA advertising was principally a coded form of anti-Catholicism, it is highly likely that at 
least some of this activity reflected a fear of contagion. It is surely telling that such advertising 
in British newspapers occurred most exclusively in London and Lancashire, the two areas with 
the largest Irish-born populations in the country, and reached its peak in the wake of the Great 
Famine.101  
 
Conclusion  
As is now well known, Irish immigration to Britain during the late 1840s stoked fears about 
the moral and physical decline of the native population in already overcrowded and unhealthy 
cities. Working people feared their competition, while educational moralists feared a 
degenerative effect on established British culture; communal disorder and violence seemed to 
increase in their wake. Ministering to the overwhelmingly Catholic religious needs of these 
immigrants also resulted in the Pope’s restoration of the Papal Hierarchy (the ‘Papal 
Aggression’), which served to unite elite and plebeian Protestants against the age-old foe of 
‘Popery’. While the historiography of the Irish in Britain now emphasises that integration and 
valiant community-making defined the experiences of the new arrivals, against the once-
dominant narrative of an outcast Irish Catholic immigrant population, there is nevertheless 
universal agreement that the 1840s and 1850s were especially fraught for Irish immigrants. 
This study has sought to demonstrate the importance of famine-related disease, heretofore 
generally only mentioned in passing and never until now systematically explored in its Irish 
dimensions, in fermenting such tensions. For it was not only mass Irish immigration but the 
deadly epidemic fever which was said to accompanying it across the Irish Sea that shaped 
responses to the Famine Irish. Two points are crucial here. First, the term ‘Irish fever’ was no 
misnomer. The evidence presented in this study indicates clearly that the Irish were 
overwhelmingly predominant among fever patients, at least during the summer months of 1847 
when the epidemic was at its worst. Second, despite marked local and regional variation in the 
scale and intensity of the epidemic, ‘Irish fever’ spread far beyond the western coastal regions 
which have received the bulk of historiographical attention. Mortality figures for 1847, which 
reveal considerably elevated typhus deaths in almost every region, provide some indication of 
this spread, but they seriously underestimate the true scale of the crisis because most people 
who contracted typhus did not die. If we assume a mortality rate of 10 per cent for those 
diagnosed with typhus, the c.15,000 excess typhus deaths in England and Wales in 1847 
equates to 150,000 additional cases. To add to its starkness, this figure does not include 
Scotland.  
The authorities in many parts of northern and midlands England, central Scotland and South 
Wales were quickly overwhelmed by disease ridden Irish immigrants in 1847, and others feared 
being so. Irish immigration and ‘Irish fever’ received a great deal of press attention. At local 
level, policies were introduced to remove the non-settled Irish either through repatriation or by 
forcing them out of town. We are of course used to stories of the callousness of British 
administrations, both national and local, to the problems of Irish migration in the late 1840s. 
The mass removals back to Ireland—a country which, we must remember, was in the grip of 
famine—by poor law authorities on the west coast, particularly in Liverpool and Glasgow, is 
the most conspicuous example of harsh policies. Yet, under the circumstances, with the powers 
available to them, it is difficult to see how they could have responded differently. It is 
unfortuate that 1847 was a year of economic depression, which meant high unemployment and 
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much greater pauperism among natives; ratepayers, who elected guardians each year, would 
not have accepted excessive expenditure. We must also acknowledge that the medical reponse 
to epidemic typhus, primitive though it must have been in the temporary fever hospitals, 
undoubtedly saved many lives. Nonetheless, for the hundreds of thousands of Irish men, 
women and children who crossed the Irish Sea in the late 1840s to escape the devastating effects 
of crop failure at home, life in Britain must have felt like changing misery and suffering in one 
place for the same in another. In the short term, the policies of local authorities, either to those 
sent back to Ireland or those who chose to avoid to poor law for fear of being so, must have 
brought great hardship and distress.  In the longer term, the association of the Irish with this 
deadly disease led to their further marginalisation. For the poorest immigrants—who were at 
this time the largest part of the Irish community in Britain— it contributed to the economic, 
social, religious, workplace and national hostility that made the Famine generation more 
pronouncedly and consistently outcast than any other wave of Irish arrivals on those shores.   
